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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5451
The paper analyzes the impact of the recent global crisis 
in the context of the previous two decades’ growth 
and capital flows. Growth decomposition exercises 
show that Egyptian growth is driven mostly by capital 
accumulation. To estimate the share of labor in national 
income, the analysis adjusts the national accounts 
statistics to include the compensation of self-employed 
and non-paid family workers. Still, the share of labor, 
about 30 percent, is significantly lower than previously 
estimated. The authors estimate the output costs of the 
current crisis by comparing the output trajectory that 
would have prevailed without the crisis with the observed 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, Middle East and North Africa Region —is 
part of a larger effort in the department to analyze the drivers of growth and examine the growth prospects of the region’s 
countries in the medium term. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at sherrera@worldbank.org.  
and revised gross domestic product projections for the 
medium term. The fall in private investment was the 
main driver of the output cost. Even if private investment 
recovers its pre-crisis levels, there is a permanent loss in 
gross domestic product per capita of about 2 percent 
with respect to the scenario without the crisis. The paper 
shows how the shock to investment is magnified due to 
the capital-intensive nature of the Egyptian economy: if 
the economy had the traditionally-used share of labor in 
income (40 percent), the output loss would have been 
reduced by half. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
In the three years preceding the recent crisis, Egyptian GDP growth averaged over 7 percent per 
year. The adoption of market-oriented policies, together with a boom in commodity prices and in 
capital inflows lifted growth to unprecedented levels during three consecutive years. Foreign direct 
investment flowed into the country and capital formation turned into the driver of growth. The 
virtuous circle of capital flows, investment, and growth, seemed to have no end. There were some 
signs of trouble, however: rising inflation, an appreciating currency, and high unemployment rates, 
especially among women. These challenges seemed manageable, and the diagnosis was that the 
trickle-down effect from growth would allow polishing off these rough edges.  The future seemed to 
have finally arrived in Egypt. 
The global shock that hit Egypt in mid 2008 was mostly an aggregate demand shock that reduced 
demand for Egyptian exports and lowered private investment due to increased uncertainty and 
weakened foreign direct investment. The shock led to a revision of expectations and questioning on 
the growth strategy, on the extent to which the adverse global economic surrounding would affect 
Egypt, on the country’s growth prospects and on the policy options ahead. 
This boom-bust cycle is not the first one in Egypt, and it is certainly nothing new to emerging 
economies. The objective of this report is to analyze the current slowdown within a historical 
perspective, and to frame it within the country’s long-term growth challenges.  Our analysis of 
Egyptian growth since the 1990s shows that there are clearly differentiable boom- busts periods 
tracking international capital flows cycles. The boom periods are associated with rising total factor 
productivity (TFP), market-oriented reforms and fiscal contraction, while the bust periods are 
associated with falling productivity, higher public spending and sluggish economic reform. In spite 
of the procyclical productivity behavior, the growth decomposition exercise shows that capital 
accumulation is the main driver of growth in Egypt. 
      The shock led to slower output growth without a corresponding fall in factor utilization. 
Hence, real production costs increased per unit of output.  This brings into consideration the 
determinants of productivity growth in Egypt in the medium term, and highlights that policy 
responses to the crises need to support long-term productivity growth.  The shock was confronted 
mostly by a fiscal stimulus package, which was prudent (equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP). 
However, some elements of the stabilization package, which were adequate as temporary measures 
to help firms cope with the fall in productivity or the rise in real cost of production, such as freezing 
the energy price adjustment program and lowering interest rates, artificially lower the user cost of 
capital and induce a higher capital intensity than would prevail absent such policy interventions. 
In spite of the transitory impact on the growth rate, the crisis will have a permanent effect on the 
GDP due mainly to the lower capital accumulation during the 2009-2011 period. To regain the   3
output losses, investment has to be higher or productivity has to increase at a faster pace so that 
potential GDP growth exceeds the 6% prevailing before the crisis.   Historical evidence shows that 
increased public sector spending is associated with lower TFP growth. Hence, given that the blunt of 
the crisis is over, it would be essential to gradually unwind fiscal stimulus spending and adopt a 
medium-term fiscal plan that prioritizes spending and supports allocation of resources to their most 
efficient use. Spending that enhances labor productivity and facilitates job creation, such as transport 
investment and enhancing the quality of education, should displace other spending items such as the 
energy subsidy. Such a plan would require targeted social safety nets, and coordination with the 
central bank to ensure that inflation does not erode the social welfare benefits during the transition 
period. 
The paper is divided into three sections following this introduction. The first one describes the 
Egyptian boom-bust cycles since the nineties, and subdivides the period into three stages demarcated 
by the capital flows. The key drivers of growth in each stage are identified by a growth 
decomposition exercise. The second section quantifies the short-run impact of the crisis and analyzes 
the policy responses to it. The third section examines the long-run growth prospects and examines 
the policy implications.  
I. GROWTH IN EGYPT: STYLIZED FACTS 
This section analyzes the current bust period within Egypt’s growth experience since the early 
nineties, identifying common elements and differences across different stages. We divide the two 
decades (1990-2009) into three sub-periods, based on the capital flows:  a capital inflow period 
beginning in the early nineties (1991-1998), a stop in capital flows period (1999-2004) and a capital 
boom period between 2005 and 2008.
1 This section is divided into three parts. The first one presents 
some stylized facts of growth over the whole period, the second describes the sub periods, and the 
third one reports the growth decomposition exercises for each sub-period. 
A.  LONG-TERM GROWTH IN EGYPT: STYLIZED FACTS  
Growth in Egypt has been low and fairly stable. Between the early eighties until 2009, average 
growth was around 4.9 percent p.a. (Figure 1). This was below the growth in Asian emerging 
economies. GDP per capita growth was also below that of other non-oil producing MENA countries, 
though the differences have narrowed considerably in recent years. According to Enders (2007), 
Egypt experienced only three “growth spurts” (period longer than 2 years during which per capita 
                                                      
1 There is no consistent official balance of payments information for the 70’s or 80’s, so we follow the capital 
flows series constructed by Ikram (2006), particularly useful to compare the late eighties with the early 
nineties.   4
growth exceeded 2 percent in each year) since the early eighties, the last one in 2004-08. These 
spurts followed trade liberalization, financial reforms and fiscal discipline. Growth volatility has also 
been fairly low (around 1.7 percent). On the other hand, periods of low growth (1986-1991 and 
1999-2003) were typically longer and were associated with sluggish economic reforms and weak 
public finances.  
GDP per capita has been slow to converge to high income country’s level. Comparing long-run 
GDP performance in Egypt with other countries that had similar income levels in 1965, we find that 
Egypt did not catch-up (figure 2). In fact, Egypt GDP per capita relative to that of OECD remained 
almost the same, between 5 and 6 percent over time. This contrasts markedly with the performance 
of a countries like Korea or China which have made substantial progress in catching up to the OECD 
country average.  
Figure 1 – GDP Growth Trends        Figure 2 – GDP per capita 
       Constant  US$2000 (percent of OECD GDP) 
 
   
 
There is a strong correlation between Egyptian GDP growth and OECD growth. A simple 
correlation between GDP growth in Egypt and the OECD illustrates the close linkage (Figure 3), first 
highlighted by Dobronogov and Iqbal (2005).  This simple correlation might underestimate the real 
risk in the Egyptian economy, as the big output growth drops in Egypt tend to happen during 
recessions in the developed economies, or immediately following them. Figure 4 shows how the 
most significant drops in Egypt’s output growth occur during US recession years (shaded in gray), 
with the exception of 1967 which was a year of war for Egypt
2.  
 
                                                      
2 1973 was also a year of war, but one concurrent with a recession in the US.  
Source: Ministry of Economic Development                        Source: World development Indicators WDI  5
 
Figure 3 – Correlation between               Figure 4 – Strong Correlation between  
   Egypt’s and OECD’s GDP growth rates    drops in Egypt’s growth and US recession years 
   
Recent empirical studies on growth in Egypt find that physical capital accumulation accounts for 
most of the changes in aggregate production, though its role has been declining since the early 
1980s. Meanwhile, improvements in productivity since the second half of the 1990s partially 
compensated this decline. For instance, Kheir-El-Din and Moursi (2003) analyze sources of 
aggregate economic growth from 1960 until 1998 and find that capital accumulation was the main 
driving force behind economic growth during that period, mainly because of the substantial 
quantities of unqualified labor and the prevailing employment laws which fostered the adoption of 
capital-intensive production techniques. IMF country report (2005) extends the same analysis for a 
longer period (1960-2004) and finds that both physical capital accumulation and TFP growth were 
important determinants of growth in output per worker in Egypt from 1960 to 2004, but their relative 
importance changed over time. It also finds that the current slowdown in growth of output per 
worker is due to the confluence of a decline in trend growth of physical capital per worker, and a 
negative cyclical deviation in TFP growth.  
Other studies undertook a diagnostic decision-tree approach to investigate constraints to growth 
in Egypt. Dobronogov and Iqbal (2005) examine three constraints between 1960 and 2003: low rates 
of return to capital (particularly private capital), low appropriability of returns (as a result of high tax 
rates, inefficient tax structure or high expected appropriation risk) and a high shadow price of 
finance (due to low domestic savings, poor financial intermediation or lack of access to finance). 
They report a high correlation between GDP per capita growth rate and the growth of domestic 
private sector credit, and conclude that inefficient financial intermediation constrains growth. Using 
the same methodology between 2000 and 2006, Enders (2007) explores other binding constraints to 
growth in Egypt: access to finance (low national savings, limited access to foreign savings or weak 
financial intermediation), appropriability of returns (formal taxation, fear of future taxation, cost of 
bureaucratic regulation, corruption and the cost of innovation and exploration) and availability of 
complementary factors of production. However, Enders concludes that inefficient financial   6
intermediation and the appropriability of returns are the most important constraints to growth. 
Private returns are reduced through the high cost of complex regulations and inefficient government 
services as well as the cost of innovation and exploration. He further suggests that the recent pick-up 
in growth was unrelated to efficiency improvements in the financial sector. 
B.  ANALYSIS OF SUB PERIODS  
The two decades since the early 1990s can be roughly divided into three sub-periods, according 
to the international capital flows: a first period of capital inflow in the early 1990s following the 
adoption of economic reform (1991-1998); a second period of capital outflow (1999-2004); and a 
third period of capital inflow (2005-2008).
3 Tables 1.a to 1.d describe policies and outcomes during 
the three sub-periods. This section shows the commonalities and differences across the sub-periods. 
GDP growth is procyclical with the external capital inflow/outflow, though domestic reform also 
follows a pattern of the external cycle.  Following the adoption of the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 1991, GDP grew at an average rate of almost 4 percent 
in the first period, peaking at 5.5  percent in FY97. The ERSAP aimed at resolving the macro 
imbalances through market-oriented reforms, namely, increasing the private sector participation, 
boosting international trade and privatizing many state-owned companies. A large fiscal adjustment 
brought the fiscal deficit down from 15 percent to 1.2 percent of GDP between FY91 and FY95 
(Ikram, 2006). Yet, as a result of reform fatigue, a lack of fiscal discipline, and a shock to external 
capital flows due to the Russian default and Long Term Capital Management Crisis in the United 
States in 1998, Egyptian growth reached a trough of 2.4 percent in FY02. Macroeconomic reforms 
resumed in FY05, the external environment improved and growth picked-up to 6.4 percent between 
FY05 and FY08 from an average of 4.1 percent in the previous period.  
The increase in net foreign assets (NFA) of the central bank was significant in both capital 
inflow periods. In the first one, NFA increased by US$ 1.2 billion per year on average, while in the 
second they increased by US$7.5 billion. The difference between both was that the second period 
flows were mostly foreign direct investment (FDI) which increased from less than 1 percent of GDP 
in the early 2000s to 8.1 percent in 2008. A topic that deserves further exploration is the relationship 
between the increase in capital flows and the stagnation or fall in the savings rate in the early 1990s. 
While Enders (2007) shows a stagnation or slight decline in the savings rate since the mid 1990s, 
Favaro, Garrido and Stucka (2009) show a significant fall in the savings rate from the early 1990s to 
the late nineties. This would imply a negative association between capital flows and domestic 
savings. This fall could also be associated with prevailing negative real interest rates since 2005. The 
                                                      
3 Ikram (2006) constructs a consistent BoP series for the period 1952-2000, that show capital flows rising 
sharply after the adoption of the ERSAP and the Parid Club Agreement in 1991.   7
fall in savings, associated with rising capital inflows, also took place in Latin American and East 
Asian countries during the 1990s (Reinhart and Talvi, 1998). 
Table 1.a - Real Variables  
Period average   1987-90 1991-98 1999-04 2005-08 
Percentage change 
GDP growth   5.4  4  4.1  6.4 
   Imports of goods and services  3.0  3.2  3.7  25.2 
   Gross Fixed Capital Formation   -3.0  4.9  0.4  16.6 
   Private consumption   4.6  3.5  3.4  6.0 
   Public consumption  5.5  5.0  2.9  2.1 
   Exports of goods & services  11.5  3.3  10.2  23.4 
 
 Shares   Percent of GDP 
    Imports of goods & non-financial 
services  35.1 28.6 24.1 34.4 
    Gross fixed capital formation  27.4  19.8  18.1  19.9 
    Private consumption  72.2  75  74.2  71.7 
    Public consumption  9.7  10.8  12.1  11.8 
    Exports of goods & non-financial 
services  23.9 22.9 19.6 30.9 
  Gross domestic savings   16.3  14.3  13.9  16.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ministery of Economic Development and 
Central Bank of Egypt data.  
Table 1.b - Fiscal Variables  
Period average   1987-90 1991-98  99-2004  2005-08 
Budget Sector  Percent of GDP (unless otherwise stated) 
Primary Balance   -12.0  3.2  -1.4  -2.0 
Change in primary deficit (percentage point)  -1.7  1.9  -1.2  0.5 
Overall Balance   -15.8  -3.8  -7.3  -8.0 
Change in overall deficit (percentage point)  -2.3  1.8  -1.4  0.7 
Net Public Sector Debt  na  100.5  92.3  91.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Ministry of Finance data 
 Table 1.c - Nominal Variables 
 Period average   1987-90  1991-98 99-2004 2005-08 
Percent (unless otherwise stated) 
 CPI inflation  18.8  11.5  4.2  9.6 
 Average exchange rate (LE/US$)  1.8  3.4  5.2  5.6 
 Average tariff rate  na  11.5  10.3  4.3 
Maximum tariff rate  na  30  28.1  12.3   8
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Central Bank of Egypt data.  
 
Table 1.d - External Position Variables  
Period average    1987-90  1991-98 99-2004 2005-08 
Percent of GDP (unless otherwise stated) 
  Trade Balance   -7.8  -14.8  -10.5  -12.4 
  Suez Canal dues   na  3.5  2.4  3.3 
  Tourism  na  4.4  4.7  6.7 
  Private remittances  5.0  5.1  3.4  4.9 
  Private remittances (Bn US$)  3.7 4.1  3.0  6.  1 
  Current Account Balance   -1.3  2.5  0.7  1.8 
  Foreign Direct Investment (Bn US$)  1.0  1.0  0.7  8.6 
  Foreign Direct Investment   1.3  1.9  0.8  6.7 
Capital flows   Billion US$ (unless otherwise stated) 
  Net International Reserves   1.7  14.1  13.6  25.2 
  Not Foreign Assets, annual inflows   1.1  1.2  -0.9  7.5 
  External Debt   42.2 31.8  29.5  31.1 
  External Debt to Exports (%)  583  215.5  156  78.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Central Bank of Egypt and International Finance Statistics. 
The current account, which represents the balance of saving of the economy with the rest of the 
world, shows a clear structural change in its level in the early 1990s. From being a capital importer 
from the rest of the world (negative current account), the country became a savings exporter in the 
early 1990s (positive current account). The structural shift coincides with the adoption of ERSAP. In 
2009, the current account balance turned negative again, indicating a need for external savings in a 
period of crisis when the world financial system came to almost a complete halt. 
The current account also shows an oscillating pattern around a given level. While that level was 
negative up to the late 1980s, it became positive since then.  To examine the determinants of the 
current account behavior in Egypt we use a simple version of the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
intertemporal consumption smoothing model according to which the current account is determined 
by transitory deviations of income from its permanent level, by fluctuations of investment around 
their trend, and by transitory deviations of public spending. A simple regression shows that income 
and investment are statistically significant explanatory variables of the current account behavior in 
Egypt (see Annex 1). Figure 5 shows how investment is the main driver of the current account 
oscillation. In particular, the fall of investment up to the mid 1990s is associated with the change in 
the current account. The fall in public investment implicit in the economic reform program explains 
the fall in overall investment. The predicted values would be those that the consumption smoothing   9
approach would imply, and it is clear that the observed levels are more volatile than the predicted 
values by the model.  Still, there is a trend for the observed values to oscillate around the predicted 
levels, and deviations are transitory. This would indicate that deficits were excessive in 1998-2004, 
and that the observed 2008 deficit would revert to lower levels more consistent with those predicted 
by the consumption smoothing model of the current account (Figure 6). 
 
Another differentiating factor across the sub periods is the fiscal policy stance, with fiscal 
expansion taking place in the capital outflows period, and fiscal contraction taking place during the 
capital inflows periods. We examine the stance of fiscal policy based on two indicators: the change 
in the primary fiscal balance (or the overall balance, both as a share of GDP) and a quantitative 
measure of discretionary policy that controls for the potential reaction of fiscal policy to economic 
conditions proposed by Fatas and Mihov (2003). Fiscal impulse is traditionally measured as the 
change in the primary (or the overall balance), while the second indicator is defined as the residual 
of the following model: 
 
where: - ΔG is the growth rate of government spending; 
-   ΔY is the output growth; 
-  W is a vector of control variables including a time trend 
Both indicators of fiscal policy indicate that during the capital inflows periods, fiscal policy tends 
to be restrictive, while during the capital outflows fiscal policy has been expansionary. The first sub-
period of capital inflows was one in which policy was contractive, while the capital outflows period, 
during 1999-2004, fiscal policy was, in general, expansionary. The last sub-period, 2005-2008, was   10
mostly contractionary with the exception of 2005 and 2008. Figure 7 shows the evolution of such 
index that control for the potential endogeneity of fiscal policy that can react to economic conditions. 
Figure 7- Index of Discretionary Fiscal Policy Egypt, 1987-2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Fatas-Mihov (2003) 
Inflation has been persistent, but higher in both capital inflows period (close to 10 percent) than 
in the other period (close to 4 percent). Long-term inflation in Egypt has been moderate but has 
displayed important fluctuations since the beginning of this decade, with two big spikes in 2004 and 
2008, and a smaller one in 2006. Inflation has remained in double-digit levels over the past few 
years.  Kiguel and Okseniuk (2009) show that long-term inflation is explained by traditional factors, 
such as the fiscal deficit, seigniorage, the output gap, and the level of the real exchange rate. Yet, 
while supply shocks or demand pressures may account for rising inflation in the short-term, the 
misallocation of resources is responsible for inflation persistence. This is the result of factors such as 
weak market institutions, market concentration and lack of competition, ineffective consumer 
protection as well as misguided policies to maintain production costs or food prices lower than those 
which supply and demand conditions would determine. This set of factors also affects long-term 
growth.  
 
C.  GROWTH DECOMPOSITION EXERCISES   
Analyzing the growth decomposition in the Egyptian economy allows identifying key drivers of 
growth. This section presents several growth decomposition exercises: by components of aggregate 
demand, by sector of economic activity, and finally, by factors of production. 
1)  Growth decomposition by demand components  
While growth in the first boom period (91-98) was driven by consumption, the second one was 
driven mostly by exports and investment. As to the recent boom prior to the crisis, it was mostly 
driven by exports and investment (Table 2). Between 2005 and 2009, the boom in investment is   11
associated with a surge in FDI (see statistical appendix in annex 5). As a result of the crisis, not only 
did foreign direct investment decrease, but investments composition changed in favor of oil-related 
flows. This is expected to have a more limited favorable impact on growth due to restricted linkages 
to the rest of the economy and lower technology transfer. In fact, the share of FDI inflows to 
petroleum sector doubled (Figure 8).   
 
Table 2 – Contribution to Growth    Figure 8- Uses of FDI between 2004 and 2009 
by Demand Components 
 
Source: Ministry of Investment 
2)  Growth decomposition by economic sector 
Glancing at the contribution to growth of each sector, it is worth highlighting the stability of the 
contribution of services throughout the entire period, remaining above 50 percent.  The Suez Canal 
and tourism (hotels and restaurants) are important contributors in this respect. The growing 
importance of the contribution of industry has taken place to the detriment of agriculture, and this 
trend is expected to continue in the near term, as the global crisis will limit both the volume of trade 
transiting through the canal and the number of tourists travelling to Egypt. 
Table 3 - Contribution to Growth by Economic Sectors 
 Period average  1991-98 99-2004  2005-08 
Agriculture 13.9  14.1  8.4 
Industry 33.9  28.9  38.3 
Services 52.2  57.1  53.3 
    of which 
    ▪ Suez Canal  -2.1  5.4  7.4 
    ▪ Restaurants & Hotels  0.0  6.5  8.8 
 GDP  100  100  100 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Ministry of Economic Development data   12
 
 
3)  Growth decomposition by factors of production 
This section decomposes growth into factor accumulation and productivity change, based on 
similar exercises done previously for Egypt by Loayza and Honorati (2007) and Favaro, Garrido and 
Stucka (2009). The rate of change of physical capital is estimated based on historical investment 
figures with a constant depreciation rate.  The rate of change in human capital is estimated as in 
Ghosh and Kray (2000) and applied to Egypt by Favaro et al. (2009), but we modify it along three 
lines: first, we consider the share of labor income to be 40 percent, rather than the 60 percent used in 
the previous application to Egypt. 
4  Previous growth decompositions exercises for Egypt considered 
a higher share of labor, believing that the share of labor income could be underestimated because the 
income of self-employed is imputed as capital income (Gollin, 2002 and Bernanke and Gurkaynak 
2001).  
While such an adjustment could have produced significant changes in estimating the labor share 
in national income in the past, presently its effect might not be as large given the decline in self-
employment in Egypt, from 25 percent in 1986 (El Ehwany and El Laithy, 2001) to about 11 percent 
at present (Assaad, 2009).
5 Annex 2 describes our calculation of the share of labor in national 
income, which oscillates between 32 and 36 percent. In order to avoid overstating this point, we 
arbitrarily raise the share to 40 percent, still significantly lower than the 60 percent used in 
traditional growth decomposition exercises.  The capital intensive nature of the Egyptian economy is 
an important feature for at least two reasons: first, there will be low elasticity of employment with 
respect to output; and second, the higher the share of capital the larger will be the impact on GDP of 
any shock to investment. Both implications of the capital-intensive feature of the Egyptian economy 
have important consequences for the analysis of the impact of the crisis on Egypt as will be seen in 
the next two sections. 
Two other differences with previous growth decomposition studies are the use of a variable rate 
of return to education through time, as well as a changing participation rate in the last years (Said, 
2009). The rising rate of return to education in the decade between 1998 and 2006, as well as the 
increasing rate of labor participation imply higher rates of human capital accumulation. 
                                                      
4 Using social accounting matrices, several studies found that the share of capital in output increased 
from 68 percent in 1988, to 69 percent in 2001, and to 73 percent in 2007 (Eckaus et al., 1981; 
Akhter et al, 2001; and Kantor Management, 2009). Yet, the share of labor income might be 
underestimated because the income of self-employed is imputed as capital income (Gollin, 2002 
and Bernanke and Gurkaymak 2001). 
5 Note that the first study is based on Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) while the 
second one is based on Labor Market Surveys.   13
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth is the residual of the actual GDP growth rates and the 
growth rates in physical and human capital, multiplied by their shares in national income.  Results in 
Table 4 show that: 1) factor accumulation is the driver of growth in Egypt, similar to results of Kheir 
el Din and Moursi (2007) and Favaro et al. (2009); 2) physical capital accumulation is the main 
driving force in periods in which FDI is booming (early 1990s and late 2000s); and 3) TFP growth is 
positive during the reform periods, and negative in the policy reversal sub period. The results are 
worrying in terms of the prospects for growth, to the extent that capital accumulation is subject to 
decreasing marginal returns. This was the base of Krugman’s (1994) pessimism on the growth 
prospects of East Asian countries whose growth was also driven by capital accumulation.  
International experience shows that productivity growth accounts for most of the difference 
between successful growth experiences and unsuccessful ones (Easterly and Levine, 2001). But it 
also shows that countries growth may be driven by factor accumulation initially, and then be driven 
by productivity growth such as in the US experience in the late 19
th century and Japan during the 
early 20
th century (Kim, 2001). 
Table 4 - Contribution to Growth 
by Factor Accumulation and TFP Growth 
Period average  1991-1998 1999-2004  2005-08 
percent 
Human Capital  0.22  3.18  2.32 
Physical Capital  1.94  2.42  3.36 
TFP 1.79  -1.49  0.7 
GDP growth rate  3.9  4.1  6.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
The rise in capital intensity, especially since 2001, is partly explained by the energy subsidies and 
the negative real interest rates. With the increase in energy prices worldwide, the economic value of 
the subsidy in Egypt tends to increase, giving domestic producers an unsustainable competitive edge. 
On the other hand, negative interest rates experienced in Egypt induce a low cost of capital, which 
explains the acceleration of investment described in the above section.  
 
Evidence for Egypt shows that TFP falls when unsustainable policies are adopted and rises during 
periods of market-oriented reform. From Figure 9, it can be seen that TFP growth was negative until 
the 1990s, when it turned positive. After a brief reversal during the late 1990s and early 2000s, TFP 
growth turned positive again.  This evolution matches closely the three sub periods in which we 
subdivided the analysis in the present paper. The positive productivity growth sub periods match 
those of market-oriented reforms. The recovery of TFP growth in the 1990s is particularly related to 
two factors. First, the trade policy reform reduced the simple average tariff from 42 percent in 1991 
to 26 percent in 1998. The reform process stalled in the early 2000s: during 2000-2004, the trade-  14
weighted tariff rose to 20 from 15.4 percent in the period 1995-1999. In 2005-2007, it was reduced 
to 13 percent. Macroeconomic aggregate data confirms trade's positive impact on growth (Loayza, 
2009), and microeconomic evidence from firm-level data across countries shows that firms that 
engage in trade are more productive (Teal, 2007; Escribano, 2007). Evidence for Egypt supports this 
hypothesis by showing that exporting firms grow faster than non-exporting (Stone, 2009). Negative 
productivity periods such as in the 1980s, were characterized by rising public spending (the ratio of 
public investment to private investment doubled), fiscal deficits that relied on the inflation tax to be 
financed
6,and currency pegs leading to overvalued currencies that, jointly with the excessive 
spending, resulted in large current-accounts deficits. These results are verified econometrically by 
Kheir El Din and Moursi (2007) who find that productivity growth in Egypt is positively associated 
with export growth and negatively associated with public spending.  
TFP growth (figure 9) is obtained from growth decomposition on a yearly basis starting 1960. 
TFP levels are then calculated based on the growth rates. Figure 10 shows that recovery of TFP 
growth since the early nineties still has ways to go to compensate the damage done during the 
seventies and eighties. The figure in levels is introduced for comparison with later estimates of 
capital productivity that show identical trends (figure 11).
 7  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
                                                      
6 The inflation tax in the late 1980s in Egypt was estimated at almost 12 percent of GDP (Dinh and Giugale, 
1991). 
7 The marginal productivity of capital can be approximated by the ratio of the rate of growth of GDP to the 
investment share in GDP as done in Favaro et al (2009) which assumes a specific form of the production 
function (AK type). Though it may seem an extremely restrictive assumption, the marginal productivity of 
capital trend is identical to the one of TFP estimated with the growth decomposition exercise.   15
 
The second factor associated with rising productivity during the 1990s is the growing importance 
of private investment in overall capital formation (World Bank, 2008). The ratio of private 
investment to public reached a low of 0.34 in the early 1990s; this ratio rose to 1.0 by the end of the 
decade. Studies have estimated that aggregate productivity has been depressed by 30 percent due to 
the lower productivity of public production of goods and services and the widespread government 
participation in production; these facts also explain about 20 percent of Egypt’s labor-productivity 
gap with the United States (Schmitz, 2001). Hence, the longer-term perspective of factor 
productivity indicates that trade facilitation and reduction of the size of public-sector activities 
relative to the private sector should be essential elements of any policy package to increase 
productivity. Also, Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) find a positive association between savings 
rates and TFP growth in a panel of countries that includes Egypt.  Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2008) 
show that TFP growth is positively associated with FDI. Hence, productivity growth, which is 
essential for sustainable growth, requires increasing savings rates and attracting foreign direct 
investment. 
To conclude, the various growth decomposition exercises show that boom periods have been 
driven by different sectors. The first boom was driven by domestic consumption and the second by 
external demand and investments. In general, the growth of the services sector account for most of 
GDP growth but during the second boom period, industry (particularly manufacturing) has been a 
large contributor to growth. Finally, empirical evidence shows that factor (capital) accumulation is 
the main driver of growth. This capital-intensive nature of the Egyptian economy is explained by the 
prevalence of energy subsidies and negative real interest rates which both artificially lower the cost 
of capital, which is the scarce resource. Also, the boom periods are associated with rising TFP, 
market-oriented reforms, trade liberalization and fiscal contraction. In addition to this, increasing the 
savings rate is essential for productivity growth.   16
 
II. EGYPT AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The previous section showed that the recent boom period (2005-2008) was driven by external 
demand and investment. The increased export revenues, the surge in foreign direct investment and 
augmented remittances from abroad all led to the investment boom and high growth rates. 
Unfortunately, with the global financial crisis the main external sources of growth were expected to 
drop off sharply, leading to a considerable slowdown since the mid-2008. This section concentrates 





A.  THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON GDP AND EMPLOYMENT 
1)  The impact on economic growth 
The impact of the global economic crisis on Egypt’s growth was not as large as originally 
expected. The crisis reduced growth from 7 percent to 4.7 percent in FY09. All components of 
demand have been affected with lower net exports, consumption growth and investment. However, 
this is a better than expected outcome since early projections had forecasted FY09 economic growth 
between 2 and 4 percent.
8 This slowdown was also significantly less than in the developed 
economies or in most other emerging markets. 
The better than expected performance can be explained by five factors. First, because of a lack of 
integration with the world financial system, Egypt’s traditional banking sector had little direct 
exposure to the toxic assets in developed economies. Second, a positive – though declining – current 
account balance since 2005 (around 2 percent of GDP). Egypt’s external needs were low in a context 
of global financial imbalances. Third, the fiscal stance and high nominal GDP growth led to 
significant declines in the public debt ratios in the years preceding the crisis. Hence there was room 
for policy maneuver, as Egypt had cushions that permitted assimilating the shock. Fourth, the limited 
role of private investment (around 15 percent of GDP in 2008) compared to the rest of the world, 
minimized the impact of the shock on overall investment, which suffered the bulk of the crisis 
impact. Also, the confidence crisis had a marginal impact on consumption growth which remained 
positive (around 5 percent). In the developed economies, for instance, business investment fell by 15 
to 20 percent, while consumption only fell by 1 to 5 percent. Fifth, the response to the crisis was 
                                                      
8 Other estimates include those of Abou-Aly, 2008 (4 percent in FY09), the IMF, 2009 (3.6 and 3 percent in FY09 and 
FY10 respectively), and the Ministry of Economic Development, 2009 (4.4 and 4.0 percent in FY09 and FY10 
respectively).   17
prudent and adequate both in terms of the fiscal and monetary stimulus (see section on the 
assessment of the crisis). Yet, while these features have sheltered Egypt from the impact of the 
financial crisis, some of them, namely, limited financial development and low private investments 
have also been constraints to long-run growth.  
The impact of the crisis fell squarely on the activities that experienced rapid growth in recent 
years. Only two sectors’ output fell: oil refining (-4.2 percent) and Suez Canal services (-7.2 
percent). Restaurants and hotels managed to maintain positive but very low growth at 1.3 percent. 
On the contrary, some sectors such as construction and building outpaced the previous year, up by 
20.2 percent in FY09 compared to 15.7 in FY08. Other sectors kept growing at almost the same 
modest pace, such as wholesale and trade (at 5.8 percent), agriculture (3.2 percent) and real estate 
ownership (3.8 percent), while others like the financial services have seen their growth rate declining 
(4.6 percent compared to around 7.6 percent in FY08).  
A World Bank private sector survey (World Bank 2009c) showed that small enterprises’ sales (a 
proxy for output) fell by more than large enterprises' sales. Sales of small enterprises fell by 32 
percent, while those of large firms dropped by 19 percent. Given that the shock was mostly to the 
tradable sectors, and large firms comprise the majority of exporting units, this was possibly due to 
the lower initial productivity level of smaller firms. In any event, if output contraction in small 
enterprises continues, the rise in unemployment will be larger than anticipated.
9 Any policy should, 
however, be directed towards increasing productivity in these units rather than artificially 
maintaining unproductive ones in operation.  
Input utilization, especially of labor, has been slow to react; this implies lower factor productivity 
or, alternatively, higher real costs per unit of output.
10 The private sector survey showed that the 
median firm decreased its sales by 29 percent
11, while employment fell only by 5.6 percent. Hence, 
while output (measured by sales) fell quickly, employment has been slow to adjust, and the capital 
stock remains fixed, increasing the cost per unit of output. The fall in measured productivity 
resulting from external shocks has been documented before. For instance, Calvo et al. (2006) 
documented it in countries that suffered sudden stops in capital flows.
12 
 
                                                      
9 El Mahdi and Rasheed estimate that 39 percent of total employment is in SMEs, or enterprises with fewer than 50 
workers. 
10 Harberger (2005) uses interchangeably the terms "productivity growth" and "real cost reduction" (RCR), arguing that 
growth and production take place at the enterprise level and that the second term is better understood by entrepreneurs. 
11 This figure drops to 20 percent when sales-weighted results are considered. Inventories increased moderately by 4 
percent, hence the drop in sales implies a fall in output. 
12 Other studies are: Conesa et al. (2007) studied the case of Finland after the collapses of its major trading partner, the 
Soviet Union. Also, Bergoeing et al. analyzed the case of Chile and Mexico after the interest-rate shock of the 1980s.   18
2)  The impact on unemployment and poverty 
Overall employment growth will likely decelerate over the next two years. Based on forecasted 
sector growth rates and each sector’s elasticity of demand for labor, Favaro, Garrido and Stucka 
(2009) estimate that the employment growth rate would fall to around 2.3 percent, down from the 4.6 
percent average registered between 1998 and 2006. This growth estimate is similar to that of El-
Ehwany and El-Megharbel (2008).
13 However, the Favaro et.al. employment growth forecast was 
consistent with an overall  GDP growth rate of 3.9 percent.  But, since growth turned up to be higher 
than expected, we would need to adjust their forecasted figure.  Using an elasticity of employment to 
output growth of 0.3, we adjust the Favaro, Garrido and Stucka employment growth forecast to 
about 2.8 percent (see Annex 3).
14 
The downward trend of unemployment observed since 2005 began to reverse, and the adjustment 
might be protracted. If employment growth falls to 2.8 percent as indicated above, and the labor 
force maintains the average growth rate of the past few years (an average of 4.3 percent from 2004 to 
2008), the unemployment rate would rise to 9.6 percent by the end of 2009, up from 8.9 percent in 
FY08. This estimate coincides with econometric calculations based on the historical relation between 
economic growth and unemployment in Egypt for the period 1980-2007. An autoregressive 
distributed lag model (ARDL) yields a short-run coefficient of the changes in growth of close to 0.3, 
implying that a drop of 2.3 percentage points in growth (from 7 to 4.7 percent) would be associated 
with an increase in unemployment of about 0.7 percentage points (annex 4).
15   Given the relatively 
low value of the “Okun coefficient”, as well as the low value of the elasticity of employment to 
output, we expect a jobless recovery. 
The labor market is a cause of concern given the lower job creation rates, higher job destruction 
and increases in the size of the informal labor market. In addition to the effect of the sudden stop on 
job flows, the World Bank rapid survey (World Bank, 2009c) shows that large manufacturing firms 
are reducing employment more than small firms, making it likely that informal employment will 
increase. In emerging economies, the informal labor market expands as economic activity contracts, 
and hence it is countercyclical in nature (Perry et al. 2008).  The expected increase in informality is 
                                                      
13 El-Ehwany and EL-Megharbel, 2008 found that a change of 1 percentage point in economic growth would lead to a 
change of 0.53 percentage points in employment in the same direction. 
14 The 0.3 elasticity of employment with respect to output is estimated by means of an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) model. Using both yearly data for 1980-2009, or quarterly data for 2003-2009, the long run elasticity decreases 
in value and turns statistically insignificant when a deterministic trend is introduced, and the short run elasticity is 0.1.  
In the quarterly model, the long run elasticity is 0.3, with insignificant short run elasticity. This elasticity is lower than 
that reported in the previous footnote and generally used in studies of the labor market in Egypt. 
15Annex 4 presents the estimation of Okun’s Law, which captures an empirical relationship between changes in 
unemployment and changes in output growth. The estimated coefficient used in this paper is slightly lower than the .36 
average reported by the IMF (2010) for a group of developed economies, and similar to the 0.3 originally estimated by 
Okun.   19
the result of two factors: a) wages are more flexible in the informal sector, and hence falling 
productivity results in a larger hiring drop in the formal sector; and b) the shock has been primarily 
to the tradable sector, composed mostly of formal-sector firms. The rise in informality is worrisome 
because the working conditions of the jobs are in general more precarious than in the formal sector. 
Herrera and Mohamed (2010) also find that wages in the informal sector are 13 to 14 percent lower 
than their equivalents in the formal sector.   
The impact of the global crisis on poverty in Egypt is much less clear-cut than the impact of the 
crisis on employment and unemployment.  Given the low elasticity of employment to output growth 
and the small size of the Okun coefficient described above, the only likely channel for the crisis to 
affect poverty is through the household income reduction originated by the fall in remittances from 
abroad.  The balance of payments (BoP) shows that private remittances fell by 10 percent between 
FY08 and FY09, from US$8.6 billion to US$7.8 billion. Though the fall is moderate, it still leaves 
the level of post-crisis remittances above historical values. Using household income data for 2009, 
we found that only 7 percent of households that receive remittances from abroad are poor.
16  
How this reduction affects poverty is fuzzy for two reasons.  First, because most households that 
have a migrant are non poor; Roushdy et al. (2008) report that 87 percent of the migrants belong to 
non-poor households. Our estimates based on household income and expenditure survey reported in 
the previous paragraph show that in 2009, only 6.6 percent of the households who received 
remittances were poor.  We did a simple partial equilibrium exercise of reducing the value of 
remittances by 10 percent, and examining how this would change the number of poor households: it 
increased to 6.7 percent, which is a trivial change.  This result confirms Roushdy et.al.’s finding that 
whether a household receives remittances is not a significant determinant of the poverty likelihood 
of households.  The second reason that explains the difficulty in assessing the impact of remittances 
on poverty lies in their effect on labor supply decisions, which also affect poverty. Initially Roushdy 
et al (2008) reported that having a migrant in the household reduces the likelihood of being poor by 
4 or 5 percentage points, though the same study reported that receiving remittances did not affect the 
likelihood of a household being poor.  Subsequent work by Assaad and Binzel (2009b) showed that 
most recipients of remittances are females and that their labor participation rates increase with 
remittances.  Hence, any analysis of the impact on poverty of remittances would have to control for 
the labor supply effect, which, to our knowledge, has not been done.  All this evidence casts serious 
doubt of any significant poverty impact of reduced remittances from abroad in the case of Egypt. 
3)  The stabilization package  
                                                      
16 Poor are defined as those having an income lower than 2,232 LE per person per year (World Bank, 2010). To determine 
whether the household is poor, we multiply the 2,232 LE by the number of persons in the household and compare it with 
its income.   20
The government adopted a series of measures to stabilize output growth at around 5.5 percent, 
which was the level consistent with a constant unemployment rate and close to our estimate of the 
potential growth rate of the Egyptian economy presented in the next section
17. In FY09, the 
government increased its spending by LE 13 billion on infrastructure (mainly drinking water and 
sewerage) and supporting manufacturing. Moreover, additional spending was included in the FY10 
budget, taking the projected budget deficit to 8.2 percent of GDP in 2010.  In addition to the fiscal 
stimulus package, the CBE cut its lending interest rate by 375 basis points by November 2009, which 
was facilitated due to receding inflationary pressures.
18  Also, it eased reserves requirements by 
counting commercial banks’ loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as reserve 
requirement holdings. Other measures include freezing the energy subsidy phase-out plan until July 
2010, lowering tariffs on over 250 items of imported intermediate and capital goods, and offering 
sales-tax exemptions on capital goods. This section discusses the medium-term sustainability of the 
policy mix adopted to confront the crisis. 
Regarding the fiscal stimulus package, there are two major issues to address: a) its impact on 
GDP, and b) its effect on fiscal sustainability given the country’s relatively high debt.  
a) The impact of the fiscal stimulus package on GDP 
The stimulus implied in the government’s spending package is lower than what would be needed 
to offset the full impact of the fall in external demand. Econometric analysis shows that the increase 
in public investment necessary to achieve a 1 percent growth in Egypt ranges between 2 and 4 
percent of GDP (Favero, Giavazzi and Missale, 2009 and Annex 4). By this measure, the stimulus 
package of 1.5 percent of GDP (which includes public investment as well as other categories of 
public spending) would not be sufficient to restore growth to the 2008 level.  
The low impact of public investment on GDP is explained by the leakage of resources between 
investment and capital, and the crowding-out effect of public capital in the short run. It is important 
to differentiate between investment and public capital, as not every dollar of investment effort is 
translated into a dollar of capital stock. There are leakages or “inefficacy” of investment, and given 
accounting practices, some current expenditures may be included as investment. Additionally, there 
is evidence of strong substitutability between public and private capital in the short run in Egypt. In 
the long run, however, these two factors may be complements (Annex 4, Fawzy et al., 2006; World 
Bank, 2008). Both points imply the need for rigorous economic analysis of individual projects to 
                                                      
17 A simple regression of the change in unemployment on (non-hydrocarbon) GDP growth during 1998- 2007 
shows a constant unemployment rate attained when the growth rate is close to 5.5 percent ( Favero,Giavazzi 
and Missale, 2009). Also, the last section of this paper has long term GDP forecasts showing potential GDP 
growth rates stabilizing at 6 percent per year. 
18 The CBE deposit rates were lowered by 325 basis points in the same period.   21
ensure the rationale of public sector intervention, and to minimize the leakage from public 
investment to public capital. Otherwise, the increase in public spending will not have the desired 
impact on growth and will leave the economy worse off due to the increased indebtedness or the 
higher taxation required paying for it.  
b) The impact of fiscal stimulus on fiscal sustainability  
The case for higher public spending must be balanced with a concern for sustainability, given 
that Egypt’s public debt is already high. Egypt’s net public debt is around 60 percent of GDP in 
2009, down from about 83 percent in 2005. This fall was the result of the reduction in primary 
deficits, high nominal GDP growth, and the appreciation of the currency. Due to the crisis, these 
factors will not persist in the near future: primary deficits will remain high, inflation and real GDP 
growth will be lower, and the currency will not continue appreciating. Hence, the rapid fall in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio will stop, though this should not be a matter of concern in the medium term 
(Favero, Giavazzi, and Missale, 2009). 
As long as the stimulus program is temporary, Egypt’s fiscal situation will continue to be 
sustainable. The debt sustainability analysis under multiple scenarios of growth, inflation, and 
exchange-rate depreciation show that, as long as the primary deficit does not exceed the observed 
2009 level by too much, and goes back to the planned reduction path, fiscal sustainability should not 
be a real concern. The most likely event will be a stabilization of the debt ratio in the medium term 
(until 2012), reverting to a downward trend. The key driver of debt dynamics in Egypt is the high 
potential growth rate of the economy combined with the relatively low cost of debt. In light of the 
sustainability concern, the priority should be to implement the already announced stimulus measures 
and allow the fiscal stimulus to unwind. 
The increased flexibility of fiscal policy during the crisis may come at a cost of a higher than 
expected public debt-to-GDP ratio. To keep the cost of debt servicing under control, which has been 
one of the key drivers of the past successful debt reduction episode, it is important to consider 
international evidence of the direct relationship between fiscal variables and the cost of debt service 
(Caselli, et al., 1998: Drudi and Pratti, 1999; Herrera and Salman, 2008). Based on this evidence, we 
estimate that an increase of the debt ratio by one percentage point of GDP would raise the cost of 
funding by up to 40 basis points.
19 To mitigate the immediate impact on the cost, it is essential to 
                                                      
19 A panel of developing countries shows that sovereign spreads are a function of the debt ratio (Herrera and 
Salman, 2008).  The coefficient of the lagged debt ratio in the homogenous panel estimation is around 0.4, 
or 40 basis points. Allowing heterogeneity in the spread’s response to debt, the range of estimates goes from 
13 basis points to almost 60 basis points.  The lowest estimate had an average primary surplus of over 4 
percent of GDP during the period, which is far from Egypt’s situation.  A different method, employed by 
Suescun (2007), calibrates a general equilibrium model for Latin American countries. Adopting his 
formulation for the cost of debt,  but scaling the initial level of interest rates in Egypt by the ratio of  the 
marginal productivity of capital in Egypt to the LAC countries estimated by Caselli and Freyer (2006),   22
have a medium-term fiscal plan to reassure investors that the government will fulfill its debt-
servicing commitments. A medium-term fiscal plan that is transparent and easily monitored would 
reassure investors of the government’s sound fiscal fundamentals. 
Public debt management has seen significant improvement, but more is still needed. More 
specifically, there is a need for continued effort in the development of capital markets in Egypt so 
that public-debt managers can extend maturities and diversify the base of debt holders. Of the total 
public debt, around 74 percent is domestic and 26 percent is external. Within the domestic debt, the 
marketable component (T-Bills and T-Bonds) has increased over time from 69 percent of gross 
consolidated government domestic debt in June 2008 to 76 percent in September 2009. This progress 
is welcomed and allows more market determination in prices. However, the marketable debt is 
relatively short term, and ownership is concentrated in banks. In terms of duration, T-bills’ relative 
importance within the marketable portfolio is increasing, reaching 52 percent of the total marketable 
securities by September 2009, compared to 34 percent in June 2007. In terms of holders of public 
debt, in September 2009, public banks held 49 percent of outstanding T-Bills, up from 36 percent in 
2007 (all banks –public and private- held 88 percent of outstanding T-Bills up from 63 percent in 
2007). Diversification of the public-debt investor base is essential to reduce rollover and 
concentration risk. High levels of bank holdings of public debt are not uncommon in emerging 
markets. For instance, the IMF reports that about 40 percent of domestic public debt is held by banks 
(IMF, 2006).  In Brazil, where banks are allowed to compute part of their debt holdings as reserve 
requirements, this proportion reaches about 50 percent of total T-bill holdings. 
The crisis and the government’s response changed the balance sheets of the banking sector, 
imperiling financing to the private sector if the fiscal plan and the public debt management strategy 
do not adjust accordingly with the global environment.  
Figure 12 shows the composition of domestic credit 
of the banking sector from 2006 to 2009. Until 2008 the 
importance of the government as a user of funds had 
been gradually declining, but by December 2009 the 
government's share had increased to 44 percent of total 
domestic credit. This was the result of both a subdued 
demand for credit from the private sector, and increased 
demand for funding from the government. Though the 
current loans-to-deposit ratio indicates there is ample 
liquidity in the system, a broader perspective indicates 
                                                                                                                                                                   
yields a very similar estimate of close to 40 basis points. Our estimate of 40 basis points is higher than the 
10 basis points estimated by Casseli, Giovannini, and Lane for the OECD economies. 
Source: CBE, Monthly Bulletin (2010); 
World Bank staff calculations 
Figure 12 - Composition of Domestic 
Credit of the Banking Sector   23
that the excess liquidity is being mopped up by the government as commercial banks increase their 
holdings of government securities. Further concentration of bank portfolios on government securities 
would be undesirable, as it would concentrate risk to all parties, and because it might imperil 
financing of the private sector as the economy recovers from the external shock. Though it is not 
uncommon in emerging markets for banks to hold relatively high portions of domestic public debt, 
international experience shows that the potential growth impact of fiscal policy diminishes as the 
share of public debt held by commercial banks increases (Abbas and Christensen, 2007).   
c) Other stabilization policies 
Despite the sudden stop in capital flows, the exchange rate remained largely stable. By the end of 
FY09, net international reserves were US$31.2 billion, down by US$3 billion from the December 
2008 level. This fall understates the decrease in international liquidity because it does not include the 
CBE’s other foreign currency assets, which fell significantly. At the end of July 2009, international 
liquidity   fell to US$46 billion, a loss  close to US$15 billion.
20 The fall in international reserves 
responds to a fall in demand for LE-denominated assets: M2 in local currency fell to 56 percent of 
GDP in the last quarter of 2008, and foreigner’s holdings of T-Bills fell from LE 32 billion to LE 11 
billion (approximately US$4 billion). In addition, foreigners’ net sales in the stock market are 
estimated at about US$1 billion during the period August-March 2009. This indicates that the capital 
outflow has other sources besides foreigners leaving the market in times of crisis. However, the 
exchange rate only fell by 5 percent, suggesting that the depreciation of the currency has been 
mitigated by central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market.  
Medium-term balance of payments projections indicate that the external sector may become a 
tighter constraint on growth than in the past.  The IMF World Regional Outlook 2010 forecasts a 
current account deficit of about 2.6 percent of GDP in 2010, reducing to 2.1 percent in 2011. Hence, 
in the medium term policymakers should expect increased pressure on international reserves. Part of 
this pressure can be relieved by letting the currency float more freely and by modifying the public 
debt management strategy.  
     
III. GROWTH PROSPECTS – EGYPT BEYOND THE CRISIS 
 
In the analysis of Egypt’s growth perspectives, it is important to look beyond the short-term 
effects of the crisis and examine Egypt’s economy long-term transition after the crisis. This section 
provides an analysis of growth in Egypt in the next decade.  
                                                      
20 The US$15 billion corresponds to the difference between the two stocks of international liquidity of the 
central bank (including international reserves and other assets in foreign currency) US$46 billion and US$31 
billion.   24
The cyclical fall in productivity must be framed within a longer-term perspective. The 
procyclical behavior of productivity along the business cycle has been well documented and 
researched in developed economies (Bernanke, 2000). In these economies, productivity shows a 
stable long-run trend, and deviations from it are reversed through time. The shocks in these 
circumstances are transitory, and they explain most of the volatility of the series. Hence, a 
productivity rebound could take place after the global economy recovers.  However, in emerging 
economies, the productivity trend is more volatile, and hence shocks tend to be more persistent.  For 
instance, in Mexico, factor productivity recovered its pre-Tequila level only five to six years after the 
shock (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007).  
The crisis may have long-lasting impact on factor productivity for several reasons. First, subdued 
global demand for Egyptian goods and services is expected to continue for the few years to come. 
Second, as aggregate demand shifts from tradable producing sectors towards non-tradable sectors, 
such as construction and retail trade, resources will be reallocated to the latter, generating less value 
added per worker. Therefore, aggregate productivity will decrease. Moreover, due to costly labor 
mobility
21, resources will not be reallocated in tandem with the global recovery. Third, limited and 
more expensive access to finance for international corporations will slow down foreign direct 
investment, resulting in lower levels of capital formation. These expected outcomes imply slower 
technology transfer and lower capital/labor ratios, and hence, lower labor productivity. Fourth, the 
return of migrants from the GCC countries will imply less worker remittances, which are used 
productively by households (Assaad et al., 2009a) and have a positive effect on schooling (Assaad, 
et al., 2009b). Therefore, to mitigate these likely productivity-depressing long-lasting effects, the 
Government must resume structural reform policies that support real cost reduction.  
A.  PROSPECTS: IMPACT ON POTENTIAL GDP IN THE LONG RUN 
To estimate potential GDP in the period 2010-2020, we adopt a production function approach.  
First we construct a potential GDP baseline based on assumed trajectories for human capital, 
physical capital, and productivity growth had there been no crisis. Second, we examine deviations of 
the medium-term (defined as ten years after the crisis) level of output from the baseline (or the level 
it would have reached without the crisis). We assume that the impact on potential GDP will be 
mostly through the effect of the crisis on capital accumulation, as has been the case in most OECD 
revisions of potential growth (OECD, 2009). We also assume lower TFP growth as a result of 
increased public spending (Kheir El-Din and Moursi, 2007) and reduced savings rates (Bernanke and 
Gurkaynak, 2000). 
                                                      
21 The 2008 Doing Business indicators show that Egypt tops the list of countries on ending-employment costs: the cost of 
firing, in terms of weeks of salary, is 132 weeks, while in India it is 56, in Tunisia 17, in Morocco 85, and in Brazil 37 
weeks.   25
1)  The potential GDP baseline 
The baseline scenario is the potential GDP that would have prevailed in the absence of the global 
crisis. The assumptions for physical capital accumulation, human capital accumulation and 
productivity growth are described in this section.  First, the physical capital is projected by assuming 
as constant the ratio of investment to the GDP of the previous year (as in Favaro et al. 2009).
22  In 
2008, the observed investment as a ratio to GDP of the previous year was 30 percent. Our baseline 
simulation holds this level constant throughout the forecasting scenario.  This level is the highest of 
the decade, though not as high as the 40 percent registered during the nineties. The difference is in 
the composition of investment between public and private: in 2008 public investment was 32 percent 
of total gross fixed capital formation, while in the eighties it oscillated around 70 percent. In the 
baseline scenario the private-public composition is held fixed at the 2008 level. A constant 
depreciation rate of 3.7 percent is assumed.   
 
The second element of our simulation, human capital, is constructed as in Favaro et al. (2009), 
but with modifications on the participation rate and the rate of return to education described in the 
first section.
23 The participation rate was forecasted assuming a slight increase from 53 percent to 54 
percent in the 2010-2020, continuing the observed trend between 1998 and 2006. The rate of return 
to education was assumed constant at 8 percent, based on the observed behavior of the return to 
education between 1998 and 2006 (Said, 2009; Herrera and Mohamed, 2010). 
Finally, the baseline scenario assumes TFP growth constant at 0.7 percent per year, the average 
level registered in 2005-2008. Though this is a high-growth period, TFP growth was not particularly 
high, compared to previous episodes, or by international standards.  For instance, in high GDP 
growth episodes, countries typically have higher TFP growth (Harberger, 2005): in OECD advanced 
economies’, TFP grew at a median rate of 3.1  percent per year;  the Asian Tigers’ TFP grew at a 
median yearly rate of 4.4 percent; and Latin American countries’ TFP increased at a 3.4 percent 
median growth rate. With these assumptions, we estimate the potential GDP level, and its growth 
rate oscillates around 6 percent. 
 
2)  The long-run impact of the crisis on potential GDP  
                                                      
22This assumption is needed to avoid the circularity that would occur by assuming a constant ratio of 
investment to the GDP of the same year. 
23 Favaro et. al.  construct  human  capital  stocks  (H)  based  on  Ghosh  and  Kraay  (2000)  specification:                      
Ht = POPt x WAPRt x LFRt x e
ROExSCHt, where POPt is total population in year “t”, WAPRt is the ratio of 
working age population (15-64 years) to total population in “t”, LFRt is the participation rate, ROE is a 
measure of Returns to Education and SCHt is years of schooling.   26
 The critical aspects to consider are the duration and magnitude of the shock that will affect 
capital accumulation and TFP growth. If we consider that the shock to investment arises due to 
increased risk aversion, it is important to examine how this variable has historically behaved after the 
shock.
24 Based on this past behavior of the risk aversion parameter, we initially assume that the pre-
crisis levels of private investment will be recovered in 2012. We also do sensitivity analysis to 
examine full recovery in 2011 and 2010.  
The shock to GDP took place through a drop in private investment. To determine the magnitude 
of the shock, we examine the behavior of private investment in the previous episode of a similar drop 
in growth, which occurred in 1991. During that episode, private investment to GDP fell to half its 
pre-crisis levels, from 10 to 5 percent of GDP. In this simulation, we assume a 30 percent fall in 
private investment, from 18 to 13 percent of GDP, which is close to the prevailing level prior to the 
FDI boom experienced since 2005. The simulation assumes a slight increase in public investment in 
2009 and 2010 to 10.2 percent of GDP from 9.8 percent in 2008. With the new capital stock series, 
we estimate potential GDP and compare it with the baseline case.  
Medium-term growth rates return to their pre-crisis levels. Figure 13 summarizes the deviation 
of the GDP growth rates, and shows the transitory nature of the shock. In the short term, the 
reduction in the growth rate is accounted for by the decrease in investment. The growth rate recovers 









                                                      
24 Hakkio and Ketton (2009) suggest as indicator of risk aversion the Moodys spread between AAA and Baaa 
bonds.  With data since 1919 we estimate the half-life of the shock following Mc Dermott’s method, and we 
infer that the risk aversion indicator returns to its pre-shock level after 4 years.  This is the adjustment that 
we take for the investment to GDP ratio, as well as the TFP growth.   27
 
 
We examined the sensitivity of these results to the assumption of recovery of investment levels 
by 2012. Figure 14.a shows the deviations of GDP growth from the baseline with full recovery in 
2010, 2011 and 2012. The quicker is the recovery of private investment, the lower the long-term cost 
of the crisis. Even if full recovery of private investment takes place in 2010, by 2020 there will still 
be an effect of the financial crisis on Egypt’s GDP. Figure 14.b shows that the output loss is larger 
when capital share in output is higher. 
Figure 14 – Simulation 1-GDP In levels, deviation from baseline growth 
a)  Different recovery dates        b) Different Capital Shares 
 
 
In all cases, however, the output level does 
not recover to its pre-crisis trend. In spite of the 
transitory impact on the growth rate, there will be 
a permanent effect on the GDP levels, as shown 
in Figure 15. This loss in GDP level results from 
the lower private capital accumulation and 
productivity. This exercise suggests that output 
does not return to pre-crisis level within ten years 
after the crisis even after investment is brought 
back to its pre-crisis level. Thus, unless 
investment overshoots its pre-crisis level, the 
output will always be smaller than the 
benchmark case (no crisis scenario).  
Source: Authors calculations. Figures shown are in 
percentage change with respect to the baseline 
scenario.
Source: Authors calculations.    28
 
 
These results are similar to those of the World Economic Outlook (WEO, 2009). Considering 88 
economies that experienced significant crisis over the last four decades, output was about 8 to 9 
percent lower than it would have been without the crisis. Here the impact is much lower, but so was 
the impact of the crisis on GDP. 
The previous exercise has two important limitations:  a) it assumes a constant TFP growth in 
spite of decreased private investment; and b) it assumes that the public capital stock remains 
constant, and that the productivity of both private and public capital is the same.  For the moment we 
wish to point out that in 1991, the fall in private investment coincided with a rise in public 
investment of an almost equivalent amount.  Given the differences in the productivity of public and 
private capital estimated by Favero Giavazzi and Missale (2009) and Annex 4, the output drop would 
occur more from the change in composition than in the levels of capital stock. 
TFP growth decreased as a result of the crisis. Empirical studies for Egypt show a negative 
association between increased public spending and productivity growth (Kheir El DinMoursi, 2007). 
International evidence (Bernanke-Gurkaynak, 2001) shows that there is a positive association 
between savings and growth. As a result of the crisis, both public spending increased and national 
savings rates decreased, and these existing empirical results provide us the only basis to quantify the 
impact on productivity in Egypt. Kheir El Din and Moursi show that increased public spending of 1 
percent of GDP is associated with a fall in 
TFP growth of about 10 percent, and 
Bernanke and Gurkaynak estimate that a fall 
in savings of 1 percent of GDP leads to a 
similar fall in TFP.   Figure 16 shows the 
deviation of GDP from the baseline given a 
10 percent fall in productivity growth in 2010 
and 2011, recovering the baseline growth of 
.7 percent in 2012. By 2020, potential GDP is 
around 0.25 percent lower than the baseline. 
The Figure also shows that decline in GDP 
resulting from a decrease in TFP growth 
seems to be long-lasting. And again, the 
higher the capitals share in output, the larger 
the resulting output loss. 
Figure 16 - Simulation 3: GDP Deviation from  





























































with capital share 40% with capital share 60%
Source: Authors calculations. Figures shown are in 
percentage change with respect to the baseline scenario.   29
B.  IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY  
The only way to recover the long-run GDP losses estimated in the previous section is by 
adopting policies that lift the potential GDP growth rate above the 6 percent prevailing before the 
crisis. This can be achieved through higher productivity growth rates or by increasing permanently 
the rate of capital accumulation, either physical or human. Higher permanent rates of capital 
accumulation require stable funding sources, such as domestic savings. Given the trend and level of 
domestic savings in Egypt, this does not seem a viable option in the short term. The rate of human 
capital accumulation can be changed through increasing the labor force participation and through 
increases on the return to education. All these are elements of a medium-term agenda. The most 
viable alternative in the short to medium-term is through higher growth rates of productivity.  
We identify two factors that are critical to productivity growth in Egypt. The first one is the 
public spending channel, particularly in infrastructure and transportation sector. Recent international 
evidence shows that reducing commuting costs by 10 percent can increase labor productivity by 1 or 
2 percent (Rice and Venables, 2004).  The critical question is how much public spending can 
actually reduce commuting costs. Winston and Langer (2006) estimate that for each dollar spent in 
highway construction, commuter costs decrease by 11 cents.  Extrapolating these precise figures to 
the Egyptian setting to estimate the impact of additional infrastructure spending on commuting costs 
to infer the resulting increase in productivity would be highly speculative.  
Another study of the relationship between infrastructure spending and growth in Egypt (Loayza, 
et.al. 2009) finds that the country has a level of infrastructure similar to other countries of similar 
income per capita.  The study showed that additional spending in infrastructure by 1 percentage point 
of GDP could increase growth by half a percentage point after one decade, and could reach 1 
percentage point of additional growth after three decades.  These results coincide with evidence 
presented in Annex 4 and in Fawzy (2006), of the complementary nature between public investment 
and private capital formation: a shock to public capital by 1 percent of GDP is associated with a rise 
in private capital of around 0.5 percent (equivalent to .6 percent of GDP) 5 to 6 years after the shock. 
The more long term issue is how to shift from a factor-accumulation based growth strategy to a 
productivity growth based process.  There are both microeconomic and macroeconomic studies of 
determinants of productivity in Egypt. On the micro side, studies of productivity of Egyptian firms 
(Escribano and Pena, 2010) show that the main factors affecting productivity are transportation and 
logistics costs, labor skills, and product quality and innovation. At the macro level, studies of the 
determinants of productivity growth in Egypt (Kheir El Din and Moursi, 2007; World Bank, 2008) 
point at the consolidation of fiscal adjustment, the advancement of trade integration, lowering 
inflation, improving infrastructure, and advancing institutional reform as necessary factors to support 
productivity growth.  The bulk of the institutional reform, as described elsewhere (World Bank,   30
2009) is related to the creation of the conditions that enable a more dynamic private sector to 
emerge.  These findings, together with the historical perspective of how countries change from a 
phase of capital accumulation to another of productivity growth, should serve as a roadmap for 
policymakers as to the strategies to adopt for sustained growth in Egypt.   31
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Annex 1 - Determinants of the Current Account, 1967-2009 
Dependent Variable: CAUSB 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1967 2009 
Included observations: 43 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  
              
   Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.     
LINV_CYC -5.71  2.03  -2.81  0.01 
LGDP_CYC 8.35  4.77  1.75  0.09 
LGOV_CYC 1.78  3.81 0.47  0.64 
DERP 3.28  0.59  5.6  0 
C -2.62  0.3  -8.86  0 
     
R-squared  0.54      Mean dependent var 
-
1.17 
Adjusted R-squared  0.49      S.D. dependent var  2.67 
S.E. of regression  1.9      Akaike info criterion  4.23 
Sum squared resid  136.88      Schwarz criterion  4.43 
Log likelihood  -85.91      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.3 
F-statistic  11.26      Durbin-Watson stat  0.88 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
CAUSB= Current Account in US billion of 2005 
Linv_cyc=investment deviation from Hodrick Prescott trend 
Lgdp_cyc=GDP deviation from Hodrick Prescott trend 
lgov_cyc=Gov consumption deviation from Hodrick Prescott trend 
Derp+Dummy for Economic Reform Program period 1+after 1991; 0 otherwise 
   37
Annex 2 - Estimation of Labor Share in National Income for Egypt  
 
The labor share shows how much of national income accrue to labor. The narrow measure of labor 
share refers to the ratio of total compensation of employees (wages and salaries before taxes, as well 
as employers’ social contributions) over income (GDP). However, this measurement may 
underestimate the labor share because: 
1.  National accounts do not include income generated from self-employment (owners of 
incorporated businesses) under total compensation.  
2.  Employee compensation excludes some important forms of non-wage compensation; mainly 
earned by “non-paid family workers”.  
3.  In Egypt, according to CAPMAS
25 data on labor force, these two categories (self-employed and 
non-paid family workers) represent 27 percent of the total number of workers. Moreover, 70 
percent of the private sector workers are working in unincorporated enterprises. Hence, they 
account for a substantial fraction of the workforce. 
Methodology 
1-  Numbers of self-employed and non-paid family workers are obtained from Labor Force Sample 
Surveys produced by CAPMAS. 
2-  Distribution of the two categories of workers over economic activities are obtained from the 
Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS 2006) produced by Economic Research Forum 
(ERF), with the cooperation of the Population Council and CAPMAS. The 2006 distribution is 
applied to 2007 number of workers mentioned above. 
3-  Income of each category is estimated by multiplying number of workers in each economic 
activity by the average wage within the same economic activity. In the absence of accurate 
information on the two categories workers’ earnings, we assume that their income is similar to 
wages of employees in the same economic sector. In other words, we assume that corporate and 
non corporate workers receive the same average compensation. 
4-  Average wages are obtained from CAPMAS.  
5-  Estimated income of self-employed is attributed to both labor and capital shares because they 
reflect both the returns on labor inputs and on capital investment. We do this by assuming that 
labor and capital shares are approximately the same for self-employed as they are in the 
                                                      
25 Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, the official source for provision of data and statistics in Egypt.   38
corresponding ratio in the respective economic branch (obtained from national accounts 
2006/07).
26  
6-  Estimated income of “non-paid family workers” is fully considered as returns on labor input 
because it is assumed that non paid family workers are providing almost pure labor services.  
7-  Labor share in self-employed workers income, and estimated income of the non-paid family 
workers are added to the compensation of employees income (from the formal sector and listed in 
the national accounts) to obtain the total share of labor in national income. 





2) Another measurement would be to treat the totality of self-employed earnings as labor income, thus 
assuming that this category of workers provide almost pure labor services. This would give a total labor 
share in income of 36 percent. However, the shortcoming of this approach is that it tends to overstate the 
labor share of national income because, even in developing countries, the self-employed tend to have 
substantial amounts of capital in their businesses.  
 
Remarks: 
1- Compensation of employees reported in national accounts refers to wages and salaries only and do not 
include employer social insurance contributions and benefits.  
2- Data of the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) 2006 underestimates female work for self-
employed workers and non-paid family workers in many economic sectors. Therefore, total number 
of workers in these two categories is believed to be underestimated.  
3- Our estimation is consistent with general findings that developing countries are more likely than rich 
countries to have low shares of employee compensation in GDP. 
                                                      
26 This is the best approximation we can do although we understand that it implicitly assumes that income shares are the same for establishments 
that differ significantly in size and structure. Another common convention is to allocate two-thirds of income to labor earnings and one third to 
capital income, but this remains a rather arbitrary measure to classify income of business owners. 
 
Labor share in national income =  32%   39
Annex 3 - Estimates of the dynamic relationship between unemployment 
and growth in Egypt, and estimates of the employment elasticity to output growth 
 
Figure A4.1 shows the evolution of GDP growth and unemployment in Egypt for the period 
1980-2008. It shows a rising trend in unemployment during the eighties that coincides with a 
downward trend in growth. After that period, the series stabilize but with clear negative associations, 
especially in the early and mid-nineties, as well as in early and mid-2000s. 
 
Figure A3.1 – Unemployment and Growth rates 
 
        Source: CAPMAS and MOED 
        Note: Data between 1985 and 1989 are not available for unemployment. 
 
To estimate the relationship allowing for a dynamic interaction between both variables, regardless 
of the order of integration of the two series, we estimated an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) model.  Initially lags of up to 3 years were considered, but different model selection tests 
(Akaike, Schwartz, R-Bar squared) indicated a (1,0) model was preferred. 
Table A 4.1 summarizes the error correction model (short run dynamics), and Table A2 presents the 




   40
Table A3.1- Short-Run Dynamics of the relationship between Unemployment and Growth 
 
Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model 
ARDL(1,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
*************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is dUNEMPLOY 
 22 observations used for estimation from    4 to   25 
*************************************************************************** 
 Regressor  Coefficient  Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
 dGROWTH  -0.296  0.128 -2.318 [0.032] 
 dC    0.05  0.014   3.580 [0.002] 
 ecm(-1)  -0.383  0.126 -3.052 [0.007] 
***************************************************************************  
List of additional temporary variables created: 
 dUNEMPLOY = UNEMPLOY-UNEMPLOY(-1) 
 dGROWTH      = GROWTH-GROWTH(-1) 
ecm                    = UNEMPLOY +  0.773*GROWTH - 0.132*C 
*************************************************************************** 
 R-Squared  0.396 R-Bar-Squared  0.332
S.E. of Regression  0.009 F-stat.    F(  2,  19)  6.223 [0.008]
Mean of Dep. Variable  0.001 S.D. of Dependent Variable 0.011
Residual Sum of Squares   0.002   Equation Log-likelihood  73.555




Table A3.2 - Estimated Long-Run Coefficients using the ARDL Approach 
  
ARDL(1,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
*************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is UNEMPLOY 
 22 observations used for estimation from    4 to   25 
*************************************************************************** 
 Regressor  Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
GROWTH  -0.773 0.379 -2.042   [0.055] 
C   0.132 0.020   6.746   [0.000] 
*************************************************************************** 
By means of the same method (ARDL) we examine the elasticity of employment to output growth in 
Egypt, using all available data.  First we work with yearly information on employment and output for 
1982-2009, and then we use quarterly information on employment and GDP.  
Table A4.3 and A4.4summarize the long run estimates of the elasticity with and without the 
deterministic time trend. The value and statistical significance of the elasticity decrease significantly 
when a deterministic trend is introduced in the model:  from .53 it falls to zero.  The long run is 6 
years, according to the error-correction term estimate (Table A4.5). The short run elasticity (Table 
A4.5) is 0.29.   41
 
Table A3.3 - Estimated Long-Run Coefficients using the ARDL 
Approach (with Deterministic trend) 
 
ARDL(1,1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
********************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is LEMPL 




Coefficient  Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
LGDP -0.008 0.404 -0.019  [0.985]
C   4.094  0.795  5.151  [0.000]
T   0.011  0.007  1.476  [0.156]
********************************************************************** 
 
Table A3.4 - Estimated Long-Run Coefficients using the ARDL 
approach without deterministic trend) 
 
ARDL(1,1) selected based on Akaike Information Criterion 
********************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LEMPL 




Coefficient Standard  Error T-ratio[Prob]
LGDP 0.536  0.136 3.936 
[0.001]
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Table A3.5 Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model 
 
ARDL(2,1) selected based on Akaike Information Criterion 
**************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is dLEMPL 
 24 observations used for estimation from 1985 to 2008 
**************************************************************************** 
Regressor Coefficient  Standard  Error  T-Ratio[Prob] 
dLEMPL1   0.295  0.217   1.356 [0.191]
dLGDP   0.134  0.055   2.452 [0.024]
dC   0.662  0.423   1.565 [0.134]
dT   0.002  0.001   1.417 [0.173]
ecm(-1) -0.160  0.107 -1.495  [0.151]
*************************************************************************** 
 List of additional temporary variables created: 
 dLEMPL   = LEMPL-LEMPL(-1) 
 dLEMPL1 = LEMPL(-1)-LEMPL(-2) 
 dLGDP     = LGDP-LGDP(-1) 
 dT             = T-T(-1) 
 ecm          = LEMPL +  0.056*LGDP   -4.147*C  -0.012*T 
**************************************************************************** 
 R-Squared  0.488 R-Bar-Squared  0.346
S.E. of Regression  0.001 F-stat.    F(  4,  19)  4.290 [0.012]
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.011 S.D. of Dependent Variable  0.002
Residual Sum of Squares  3.33E-05 Equation Log-likelihood  127.819
Akaike Info. Criterion  121.819 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  118.285
DW-statistic  2.041      
**************************************************************************** 
 R-Squared and R-Bar-Squared measures refer to the dependent variable dLEMPL  
 
Using quarterly data, the long run elasticity is 0.4 (Table A4.6).  Based on the error correction 
term estimate (Table A4.7), the long run is 2 quarters. The short run elasticity is close to zero. 
 
Table A3.6 - Estimated Long-Run Coefficients using the ARDL approach 
 
ARDL(1,1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is LEMPL 
 20 observations used for estimation from 2004Q2 to 2009Q1 
******************************************************************************* 
Regressor Coefficient  Standard  Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
LGDP 0.404  0.265 1.5236  [0.148] 
C 3.457 0.525 6.5888  [0.000] 
T 0.002  0.002 1.1601  [0.264] 
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Table A3.7 Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model 
  
ARDL(1,1) selected based on Akaike Information Criterion 
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is dLEMPL 




Coefficient Standard  Error  T-Ratio[Prob] 
dLGDP    0.04  0.062   0.656 [0.521] 
dC    1.81  1.018   1.778 [0.094] 
dT    0.001  0.001   0.813 [0.428] 
ecm(-1) -0.524  0.232 -2.253  [0.039] 
******************************************************************************* 
 List of additional temporary variables created: 
 dLEMPL = LEMPL-LEMPL(-1) 
 dLGDP    = LGDP-LGDP(-1) 
 dT            = T-T(-1) 
 ecm          = LEMPL   -0.404*LGDP   -3.457*C -0.002*T 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared  0.501 R-Bar-Squared  0.368
S.E. of Regression  0.005 F-stat.    F(  3,  16)  5.018 [0.012]
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.004 S.D. of Dependent Variable  0.006
Residual Sum of Squares  3.30E-04 Equation Log-likelihood  81.763
Akaike Info. Criterion  76.763 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  74.274
DW‐statistic  1.913      
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared and R-Bar-Squared measures refer to the dependent variable  dLEMPL  
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Annex 4 - On the use of public investment as a counter-cyclical tool in Egypt  
A Generalized Vector-Autoregression Approach 
 
Summary and policy implications 
 
This annex presents some evidence of the relationship between investment, in particular public 
investment, and growth in Egypt during 1960-2008.  The analysis is based on econometric estimation of a 
production function, which expresses output as a function of the capital stock and employment. The 
model is extended to incorporate restrictions imposed by long run relationships between  Egypt and its 
main trading partners, namely the OECD and the MENA region.   The main policy implications of these 
preliminary findings are: 
 
a. The impact of public capital on GDP is not big, and it is smaller than the impact of overall capital. 
Hence, policies conducive to private capital formation should, in general, be preferred as growth-
promoting tools.  To compensate a 1 percentage point growth slowdown originating from the 
shock to OECD growth, the capital stock has to increase by about 2 percentage points of GDP. 
b. From the policy perspective, it is important to differentiate between investment and public capital, 
as not every dollar of investment effort is translated into a dollar of capital stock. There are 
leakages or “inefficacy” of investment.  Hence, allowing space for inefficacy would imply an even 
larger amount of investment. However, this would imply that policy is validating the inefficiency, 
when it should be aimed at reducing it. 
c. Private capital decreases as public capital increases. We found a strong substitution effect of public 
and private capital in the short run.  This explains the low “productivity” of public capital in the 
short run. In the long run, however, there is some evidence of these two factors being 
complements.  
d. These results point at the necessity of rigorous economic analysis of individual projects to ensure 
the rationale of public sector intervention, and to minimize the leakage from public investment to 
public capital.  Otherwise, the substitution effect and the inefficacy of public investment will lead 
to undesired effect of increased public investment leaving the economy worse-off. 
Some of these results are comparable to those reported elsewhere (World Bank, 2008 and Favero, 
Giavazzi and Missale, 2009), though different methodologies are employed. Robustness of these results, 
however, still has to be evaluated, given uncertainty about the quality of the data, and the limited degrees 
of freedom.  Another crucial step is to incorporate the role of the financing (debt or taxes) of the 
additional public spending. Probably this will require a modeling approach that complements the purely 
econometric estimation adopted here.  
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Methodology  
 
Based on a production function approach, we verify the existence of a long run equilibrium relationship 
between output, capital stock and employment.
27  This simple framework is extended to incorporate 
information from international factors that are relevant for the Egyptian economy, such as the oil price, 
and the output growth of OECD economies and the MENA region. 
 
The enlarged system consists of 5 variables:  Egypt‘s GDP (EGDP), capital stock level (KSTO), OECD 
GDP (OECD), MENA GDP (MENA), and the oil price in real terms (OILPR).
28 We restrict the system to 
two equilibrium relationships (cointegrating vectors) between these 5 variables, as these will impose 
constraints in the short run output fluctuations equation (error-correction equation for Egypt’s output), 
shown in Table 1.  To estimate the impulse-responses and the variance decompositions, we used a 
Generalized Vector Autoregression (GVAR) approach, which has the advantage of bypassing the 
ordering problem generally found in VAR analysis (Koop, Pesaran and Potter, 1996) 
  
The following results summarize the exercise:  
1.  The error-correction equation for GDP has a good explanatory power ( R-Bar of 56 percent), and 
all the signs are the expected ones. 
2.  There seems to be no major structural breaks in the relationship between these variables (based 
on sum of residuals test and sum of squared residuals test) 
3.  The variability of output in the short run is explained mostly by inertia of the GDP series, the 
OECD output, and regional MENA output  (based on the forecast error variance decomposition) 
4.  The impulse response functions show the expected responses to various shocks.  The one we wish 
to highlight is the response of GDP to a shock in the capital stock (Figure 1).  The magnitude of a 
shock is 0.5 percent of the capital stock
29 (or, close to 1  percent of GDP), and the response of the 





                                                      
27 The data is annual from 1960-2008, and is an update of a recently used in the Egypt Development Policy Review 
(World Bank, 2008). Further work is currently being done to refine these calculations. 
28 Initially we omitted the employment variable given that it turned out statistically insignificant and the extremely 
limited degrees of freedom.  Future revisions of this note will use output and capital stock per worker.  
29 This is one standard error of the series.   46
Table A4.1 – Short-run output fluctuations in Egypt 
Error-correction model (ECM) for Egypt GDP estimated by OLS based on cointegrating 
VAR(2) 
******************************************************************************** 
 Dependent variable is dLEGDP601 
 41 observations used for estimation from 1968 to 2008 
******************************************************************************** 
 Regressor  Coefficient Standard Error    T-Ratio [Prob] 
dLEGDP6011    0.457 0.142 -3.227 [0.003] 
dLKSTOTO1    0.490 0.122     4.005 [0.000] 
dLOILPRI1    0.027 0.013     2.018 [0.052] 
dLMEGDP651    0.293 0.120     2.455 [0.019] 
dLOEC60101    0.545 0.223   2.446 [0.020] 
ecm1(-1)  -0.050 0.008   -6.162 [0.000] 
ecm2(-1) -0.003 0.008 -0.387  [0.701] 
******************************************************************************** 
 List of additional temporary variables created: 
 dLEGDP601   = LogGDP-Log GDP(-1) 
 dLEGDP6011 = LogGDP601(-1)-LogGDP(-2) 
 dLKSTOTO1  = Log KSTOTO(-1)-LKSTOTO(-2) 
 dLOILPRI1     = Log OILPRI(-1)-Log OILPRI(-2) 
 dLMEGDP651 = Log MENA GDP(-1)-Log MENA GDP(-2) 
 dLOEC60101  = Log OECD GDP(-1)-Log OECD GDP(-2) 
 ecm1            = -2.356*LEGDP601 + 0.857*LKSTOTO - 0.580*LOILPRI + 8.258*LMEGDP65 
-7.3349*LOEC6010; 
ecm2                = 2.223*LEGDP601 + 1.434*LKSTOTO - 0.090*LOILPRI -1.186*LMEGDP65 
 -4.504*LOEC6010 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared  0.628 R-Bar-Squared  0.563
S.E. of Regression        0.008 F-stat.      F(6, 34)  9.583 [0.000]
Mean of Dependent Variable  0 .021 S.D. of Dependent Variable  0.012
Residual Sum ofSquares  0.002 Equation Log-likelihood  143.228
Akaike Info. Criterion  136.227 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  130.230
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elasticity of output with respect to the capital stock as estimated from the previous exercise may still be of 
limited value for policy purposes for several reasons: a) it does not differentiate between investment and 
capital; b) it does not differentiate between public and private investment, assuming the same 
“productivity” for both types of capital. c) it does not contemplate possible responses of private capital to 
the shock in public capital 
 
a)  Investment is not the same thing as capital.  
 There are inefficiencies in converting a dollar of investment into capital, especially in the public sector.  
There are alternative ways to estimate this “inefficiency”: one, is to follow Pritchett (2000) based on a 
growth decomposition exercise for a sample of countries for over 30 years. He observed that total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth is extremely low, and even negative, and interpreted this as the result of an 
overstatement of the reported capital accumulation.  Pritchett points out that it is inappropriate to measure 
capital as the accumulation of depreciated investment efforts that are not necessarily effective.   Hence he 
estimated the growth rate of capital that would be consistent with TFP growth of between 0 and 1 percent 
per year. This growth rate is much lower than capital growth rate actually reported in the entire sample of 
countries.  The difference between both is the degree of inefficiency in investment. 
 
Pritchett estimates the “inefficiency” across the world. For the MENA region, he estimates the efficacy of 
investment at 46 percent.  According to these estimates, every dollar of investment spending translates 
into 0.46 to the capital stock. 
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The other approach to estimate the inefficiency is econometrically as proposed by Hurlin (2006).  He 
estimates for some LAC countries the “efficacy” parameter at around 40 percent, though the efficacy 
depends on the specific type of infrastructure and the amounts being invested, with efficacy falling as the 
magnitudes of investment increase. 
 
Both options indicate that assuming an effectiveness level of the order of 60 percent, at most would be  
realistic.  Hence, if there is a shock to OECD growth of about 2 percentage points, the impulse response 
function of Egyptian growth will be of about 1 percentage point slower growth.  To compensate that, the 
capital stock would have to increase by about 2 percentage points of GDP, which in turn would require 
additional investment of 3.3 percent of GDP.  A relevant policy question is whether this additional space 
for ineffectiveness should be validated. Clearly the economic analysis of projects, and expenditure 
monitoring would tend to reduce this leakage of resources. 
 
b)  Response of private sector to increased public capital 
 
To differentiate between the impact of public and private capital on output, we separated the capital stock 
into its public sector and private components.  The data comes from the Egypt Development Policy 
Review (DPR). 
 
Table 2 shows the equation for Egyptian output growth.  The regression shows improvement in the 
explanatory power (to 64 percent, compared to the previous 56 percent).  The impulse response function 
(Figure 2) shows that a 1 percent of GDP shock to public capital increases output by about 0.15 percent.  
This extremely low value is probably due to the decline in private capital in the short run (Figure 3). 
However, in the lng run there seems to be positive response of private capital to the increase in public 
capital  Certainly the modeling effort has to be refined to include the financing effects of the additional 
public spending, but the limited degrees of freedom might force an alternative strategy to the strictly 
econometric one, along the lines described by King (1995).   
 
In Table 2 we can also appreciate a different impact of private and public capital stocks on growth.  The 
short run impact of the private stock is 1.8 times that of the public sector.  The statistical significance of 
both coefficients also differs, with the public sector coefficient being insignificant at the 5 percent 
confidence level.  In the long run there are even more striking differences, that still have to be validated.    
 
The main policy implication of these results is that, to avoid the substitution effect and maximize the 
impact of public spending on output and social welfare,  it is a necessary condition to do rigorous 
economic appraisal of projects that begin by verifying the rationale for public intervention in specific 
activities.   49
 
Table A4.2 - Short run output equation, differentiating public and private capital 
 
ECM for variable LEGDP601 estimated by OLS based on cointegrating VAR(2) 
************************************************************************ 
 Dependent variable is dLEGDP601 
 41 observations used for estimation from 1968 to 2008 
************************************************************************ 
 Regressor  Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
dLEGDP6011  -0.474 0.124 -3.810[0.001] 
dLKSTOPUB1  0.201 0.108 1.864[0.071] 
dLKSTOPRI1  0.363 0.084 4.339[0.000] 
dLOILPRI1  0 .032 0.014 2.291[0.029] 
dLMEGDP651  0.205 0.098 2.097[0.044] 
dLOEC60101  0.301 0.183 1.644[0.110] 
ecm1(-1)  -0.0473 0.007 -6.494[0.000] 
ecm2(-1)  -0.018 0.007 -2.487[0.018] 
************************************************************************ 
 List of additional temporary variables created: 
 dLEGDP601     = LEGDP601-LEGDP601(-1) 
 dLEGDP6011   = LEGDP601(-1)-LEGDP601(-2) 
 dLKSTOPUB1 = LKSTOPUB(-1)-LKSTOPUB(-2) 
 dLKSTOPRI1  = LKSTOPRI(-1)-LKSTOPRI(-2) 
 dLOILPRI1       = LOILPRI(-1)-LOILPRI(-2) 
 dLMEGDP651  = LMEGDP65(-1)-LMEGDP65(-2) 
 dLOEC60101    = LOEC6010(-1)-LOEC6010(-2) 
 ecm1                 =  4.2030*LEGDP601+ 2.5034*LKSTOPUB-1.3201*LKSTOPRI 
+1.3216*LOILPRI -7.0216*LMEGDP65 -0.78338*LOEC6010; 
ecm2                   = -0.73984*LEGDP601-1.9216*LKSTOPUB+ 1.4130*LKSTOPRI -
0.85086*LOILPRI - 2.3742*LMEGDP65 +  4.6655*LOEC6010 
************************************************************************ 
 R-Squared  0.707 R-Bar-Squared  645
S.E. of Regression  0.007 F-stat.    F(  7,  33)  11.363[0.000]
Mean of Dependent variable       0.021 S.D. of Dep. Variable  0.012
Residual Sum of Squares  0.002 Equation Log-likelihood  148.083
Akaike Info. Criterion  140.083 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  133.229
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Figure A4.2 - Generalized Impulse Responses to one S.E shock in the equation for LKSTOPUB 
 
 




The above results are comparable to those of a previous World Bank report, which we reproduce here for 
the sake of completeness.  That report tackled two questions
30:  (1) are private and public capital 
substitutes (i.e. could one be replaced by the other); and (2) which contributes more to generate the 
output?  To answer them, the DPR estimated a production function where labor combines with 
“composite capital” that in turn consists of a combination of private and public capital where the degree 
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where Y represents aggregate output, A is the efficiency parameter, K represents capital, the subscripts 
PUB and PRI denoting public and private respectively,  indicates the relative importance of public 
                                                      






capital,   is the share of overall capital in production, and  is a parameter directly related to the 
elasticity of substitution between private and public capital (more precisely, the elasticity). 
  
A constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function forms the “composite capital” from 
combining public and private capital; and a Cobb-Douglas production function combines this composite 
capital with labor to produce the final output. 
As is standard in the literature, the regression equation is estimated in growth rates (not levels expressed 
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where a dot above a variable denotes growth rate.  This function is estimated applying non-linear least 
squares with annual data for two periods: 1960-2006 (which has more observations) and 1983-2006 
(which includes only the years with better quality data).  For technical reasons, 
2 ) 1 (      is estimated 
(not ), from which  is calculated using the restriction that  1      .   
Table 1.1 shows that the estimates for the two periods are of similar orders of magnitude. 
Table A4.3 - Estimate of Parameters 
Perio
d 





























Source: Standard Errors in parentheses. 
The  (capital’s share of output) estimated for the 1960-2006 period is 0.35, close to 0.4 assumed for the 
Solow growth decompositions and similar to estimates for other countries.  The estimated  is small 
which implies a very high elasticity of substitution between public and private capital, ,  and that  is 
close to unity.  The relative contribution of public capital in the formation of composite (or overall) 
capital in the economy, , is estimated to be 0.21: in other words, private capital’s contribution to the 




Annex 5 - Statistical Appendix 
Table A5.1 - Basic Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
    YR91 YR92 YR93 YR94 YR95 YR96 YR97 YR98 YR99 YR00 YR01 YR02 YR03 YR04 YR05  YR06  YR07  YR08 
GDP  (US$)  35851 41876 46294 51697 60138 67640 78466 84829 90597 97954 90284 84206 80288 78782 89601 107426 130433 162818 
GDP Per Capita (Current 
US$)  607  694  753  825  942 1039 1183 1255 1316 1396 1262 1155 1081 1040 1161  1367  1629  1997 
Population growth (% )  2.24  2.08  1.96  1.91 1.91 1.91 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.91 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.91 1.90  1.88  1.86  1.83 
GDP  growth  (%)  3.7 1.9 2.5 3.9 4.7 5.0 5.3 4.1 5.4 5.9 3.4 3.2 3.1 4.2 4.6  6.9  7.1  7.2 
GDP growth by Sector (% )                                                       
   Agriculture  2.4  2.0  2.5  3.8 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.6 2.8 3.4 3.3  3.2  3.7  3.3 
      Industry  4.8 1.6 2.2 5.5 5.0  18.0  -7.0 4.0 6.6 5.3 3.1 3.6 1.6 2.6 4.0  9.8  8.0 30.5 
      Services    3.3 2.1 2.7 3.0 5.0  -3.3  16.1 4.2 5.3 7.0 3.5 2.8 4.2 5.5 5.4  6.2  7.4  -6.8 
GDP growth by demand 
component (% )                                                       
   Private consumption (% )  4.14  3.27  2.97 4.23 3.32 4.02 4.21 2.24 4.62 5.15 3.99 2.17 2.33 2.10 4.83  6.44  6.94  5.73 
   Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (% )  -8.59 -3.42  -13.36 10.42  6.42 11.35 13.38 22.64  3.93 -2.30  -2.19 5.51  -8.74 6.17  14.22 13.79 23.76 14.81 
 Share of GDP (% GDP)                                                       
    Private consumption  84.18  83.03  84.41 84.86 85.00 87.31 88.49 88.00 86.64 87.06 86.59 86.36 85.70 84.42 84.29  82.89  83.73  83.20 
    Gross fixed capital 
formation  23.73 19.91 18.69 19.43 19.17 17.31 17.94 21.33 20.81 18.94 17.73 17.81 16.31 16.40 17.92  18.73  20.85  22.28 
    Gross domestic savings  15.82  16.97  15.59 15.14 15.00 12.69 11.51 12.00 13.36 12.94 13.41 13.64 14.30 15.58 15.71  17.11  16.27 16.80 
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Table A5.1 - Basic Macroeconomic Indicators (Cont’d) 
 
  YR91  YR92  YR93  YR94  YR95  YR96  YR97  YR98  YR99  YR00  YR01  YR02  YR03  YR04  YR05  YR06  YR07  YR08 
External Sector                                                       







11472  -9363 -7517 -6615 -7834  -
10359  -11986 -16291 -23415 
  Current  Account  Balance 
(US$ )  3820  2670  2295 410 386  -185 119  -2479  -1724  -1163 -33 614  1943  3418  2911 1752 2269  888 
  Foreign  Direct  Investment 
(US$)  1,125  1,152  1,140  1,321 783 627 770  1,104 711  1,656 509 428 701 407  3,902  6,111  11,053  13,237 
  International  Reserves 
( L . E )             15130 14244 14147 14809 14781 19302  22931  28559  34572 
        In months of imports of 
Goods and NFS            8.0 7.9 8.7 9.1 7.6 7.7  7.2  7.5  6.6 


















25,345  28,661 29,396 29,872 28,949  29,593  29,898  33,893 
    External Debt to Exports 
(%)     249.9 257.2 227.2 203.7 173.5 179.3 180.0 152.7 135.0 171.2 157.6 127.5 100.3  82.4  70.4  59.9 
  Interest  Payments  to 
Exports (%)      10.7  10.7 9.2 7.8 6.0 4.6 5.1 4.3 3.9 4.1 3.4 2.5 2.0  1.6  1.4  1.2 
  Nominal  Exchange  Rate 
(eop)(end of Year)  3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 4.5 4.5 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.5  5.5  5.5  5.7 
 Real effective exchange rate  94.9 100.0 107.0 112.6 119.7 123.5 125.4 127.9 128.6 125.6 111.9 141.3 112.8  88.4  92.1  99.6  91.7  88.8 
Public Sector                                                       
  PS. Overall Balance (% of 
GDP)  7.3 5.5 3.6 2.1 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.0 3.6 3.9 6.0  10.2  10.4 9.5 9.6  8.2  7.3  6.8 
  Net Public Sector Debt (% 
of GDP)  731.5 545.2 356.3 211.3 124.4 130.6  87.6  98.1 355.1 394.0 601.7  1015.7  1043.3 945.3 959.0  815.7  734.4  682.5 
Economic Activity                                                       
  Unemployment (%)     11.1  11.3  11.8  9.5 8.1 8.0 8.2 9.0 9.2  10.2 11.0 10.3 11.2  10.6  8.9  8.7 
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Table A5.2 - Domestic and International Financial intermediation 
 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
 Money Supply 
            Annual  growth  (%)  na    12.0 16.3 15.4 11.9 10.8 11.4 11.6 12.1  1.9  7.4 11.9 12.4  15.5  15.6  21.8  20.1  29.9 
       Policy interest rate*  na   na  na  na  na  na na na na    na na na na  na 9.5 8.0 8.8  10.5 
Credit market 
      Total Credit growth (%)  na   1.5  4.9  11.7  11.5  16.9  17.8  15.3  21.3  11.6  12.4  11.9  7.6  8.9  10.6  9.2  4.3  7.5 
      Total credit (% GDP)  89.3  73.3  68.9 68.3 65.3 67.9 69.0 73.6 83.4 84.2 89.7 95.0 92.8  87.0  86.7  82.5  71.3  63.8 
      Credit to the private sector growth (%)  na   5.1  21.5  22.9  33.1  27.2  27.5  25.5  24.6  13.4  9.6  11.5  6.6  4.5  3.6  8.6  12.3  12.6 
      Credit to the private sector (% GDP)  28.3 24.0 26.2 28.5 32.6 36.8 40.5 47.1 54.8 56.2 58.4 61.6 59.6  53.6  50.0  47.4  44.1 41.3 
      Headline lending interest rate**  na   na  na  na  na  na  13.2  13.2  12.8  13.1  13.6  14.1  13.5  13.3  13.4  12.5  12.6  12.0 
Capital markets 
Price index EGX30 - End of June (Base 
year  Jan  1998=1000)  na na na na na na na  794  835  864  593  472  776  1,441  4,829  4,773  7,803  9,827 
     Market capitalization (% GDP)  30.8  31.3  36.0 35.6 62.6 61.0 80.8 90.8 
Inflation: (% p.a.) 
    CPI  14.7  21.1  11.1  9.1  9.4  14.5  6.2  5.7  3.7  2.8  2.4  2.4  3.2  10.3  11.4  4.2  11.0  11.7 
      WPI***  16.2 18.5 10.2  4.7  5.4 10.1  4.8  0.6  1.7  1.6  1.3  3.5 11.6  17.3  9.9  4.1  11.8  17.6 
Total capital inflows (net) (% GDP) 
    -  FDI  (net)  3.1 2.5 2.2 2.5 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.8  0.3  4.3  5.6  8.1  7.4 
    -  Portfolio  (net)  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.9  -0.4  -0.2 0.5 0.3 1.2  -0.5 -0.1  1.5  1.9 -1.1 -1.4 
 
*Overnight CBE deposit rate 
** Lending 1 year 
***+ Starting September 2007, The WPI has been replaced by the Producer price Index PPI. 
 
 